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Abstract. We consider a general model of social choice over metric
spaces, in which—similarly to the spatial model of elections—each voter
specifies an ideal element of the metric space. The ideal element functions
as a vote, where each voter prefers elements that are closer to her ideal
element. But it also functions as a proposal, thus making all participants
equal not only as voters but also as proposers. We consider Condorcet
aggregation and a continuum of solution concepts, ranging from mini-
mizing the sum of distances to minimizing the maximum distance. We
study applications of the abstract model to various social choice settings,
including single-winner elections, committee elections, participatory bud-
geting, and participatory legislation. For each application, we compare
each solution concept to known voting rules and study various properties
of the resulting voting rules. Our framework provides expressive aggre-
gation for a broad range of social choice settings while remaining simple
for voters, and may enable a unified and integrated implementation for
all these settings, as well as unified extensions such as sybil-resiliency,
proxy voting, and deliberative decision making.
1 Introduction
Different models of social choice are concerned with aggregation of different ob-
jects. For example, the most basic social choice setting is single-winner elections
(see, e.g., [5,44,18]), in which voter preferences over a given set of alternatives
are aggregated to decide upon a single winning alternative. More complex so-
cial choice settings include multiwinner elections [25], in which voter preferences
are aggregated to select a winning committee, and participatory budgeting (see,
e.g., [31,8,26]), in which voter preferences are aggregated to select a bundle of
items respecting a given budget limit. Further social choice settings include graph
aggregation [20] and aggregation of combinatorial domains [15].
It is usually fruitful to tailor mathematical foundations and social choice
theories for a specific social choice setting. Here, however, we study a general
framework of social choice that can be applied to many settings at once. Ob-
serving the plethora of social choice settings, one merit of our model is that
it incorporates many social choice settings in a uniform way, which allows an
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investigation of complex settings and may enable a unified and integrated im-
plementation to many social choice settings at once. Furthermore, a key merit of
our model is being egalitarian, in the sense that participants are not just equal
as voters on proposals predetermined by others, but are also equal as proposers.
This is manifest especially in our approach to budgeting and legislation,
where the domains of budgets and laws are open-ended and potentially infinite,
whereas in the classical social choice setting as external authority is assumed to
fix a finite number of alternatives prior to the vote. Thus our model enables de-
liberative processes in which participants transition between making proposals,
negotiating changes in competing proposals to achieve common ground, building
coalitions in support of a particular proposal, and supporting proposals different
from their original ones as a result of negotiation, deliberation, and coalition
building. The result could be a deliberative framework in which participants are
equal as proposers, deliberators, coalition builders, and voters.
Furthermore, by letting voters only specify their ideal points, and relying
on the metric space to infer more complex preferences, our model can incorpo-
rate very complex aggregation scenarios (such as participatory legislation) while
remaining relatively simple for voters (wrt. the general trade-off between expres-
siveness and cost). On the other hand, this simplicity means that certain voter
preferences cannot be expressed, such as a dependency among budget items or
the inconsistency of an intermediate point between two legislative texts; we elab-
orate on this point in Section 9 and discuss possible remedies. Finally, we find
efficient aggregation algorithms to many of the scenarios we consider. Coping
with the NP-hardness of the remaining scenarios is left for future study.
Our model, described in Section 2, consists of elements connected via a met-
ric. The elements of the metric space may serve in three roles: proposals, votes,
and outcomes of the vote aggregation process. We associate each voter with a
single element of the space, referred to as the voter ideal element, understood as
her most-preferred element of the space. Then, we assume that each voter prefers
closer elements to elements which are farther away from her ideal element. Given
a metric space, we are interested in aggregating several voter ideal elements in
it into an aggregated element, which is the election winner (we discuss other op-
tions in Section 9). We study several solution concepts: Condorcet aggregation,
in which a Condorcet-winning aggregated element is selected (if it exists); and a
continuum of solution concepts, containing on one end a solution concept that
minimizes the sum of distances to the ideal elements and, at the other end, a
solution concept that minimizes the maximum distance to the ideal elements.
We study applications of this model to various settings of social choice. For
each application we identify a metric space suitable for the application, and
investigate each solution concept by comparing it to known aggregation meth-
ods and studying its axiomatic properties. While our model can be applied to
further social choice settings, here we concentrate on the following, prominent
settings: 1. Plurality elections (Section 3); 2. Social welfare functions (Section 6);
3. Single-winner elections over a 1-dimensional Euclidean issue space (Section 4);
4. Committee elections (Section 7); 5. Continuous participatory budgeting (Sec-
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tion 5); and 6. 2 Participatory legislation (Section 8), in which the task is to
aggregate text drafts. The study of further settings is left to future work. A key
initial motivation for our work was participatory legislation, which is perhaps
the most complex setting we study here. To the best of our knowledge, here we
propose the first aggregation method for this important social choice setting.
Related Work. The spatial model of elections [21] considers voter ideal ele-
ments and infers voter preferences using an underlying Euclidean metric. Here,
we consider general metric spaces, including discrete and not limited to Eu-
clidean, and hence can apply our model to a broad range of social choice settings.
Metric preferences are quite prominent in the social choice literature. Much of
this research is similar to ours in considering ideal elements of voters and alter-
natives. Contrary to our model, however, extant literature is usually concerned
with aggregating derived rankings rather than with directly aggregating the
ideal elements themselves. Specifically, the notion of distortion [41] is promi-
nent (e.g., [32,47,3]). Here, in contrast, we aim to aggregate the ideal elements
and argue this to be a productive approach. Indeed, the idea of using distances
in social choice is prominent; e.g., distance-based completion principles used in
combinatorial voting [34] which relate to set extensions [9] and are used in com-
mittee elections. We do not aim to reinvent the wheel in the applications we
consider, but rather to propose a unified model and incorporate many social
choice settings at once; thus, we discuss such relations in the respective sections.
We do mention the general concept of distance rationalizability (DR) [19], in
which voting rules are defined via consensus classes and distances. Here, we do
not consider consensus classes per se, but aggregation methods of ideal elements.
Specifically, DR is concerned with summing voter distances to reach consensus
in the ordinal model of single-winner elections. This relates to our social choice
maximization (specifically, the unanimous consensus [19]). But, notions such as
Condorcet aggregation do not easily fit to DR and, furthermore, our focus is on
a general metric-based model as it applies to a variety of social choice settings.
Finally, we mention the work of Feldman et al. [28]; specifically, their location
model is very similar to our metric-based model, but their study is focused on
other aspects, such as on randomized mechanisms. We also mention the work of
Fain et al. [23] and Garg et al. [30], which also consider aggregation in continuous
metric spaces. Additional works that tackle facility location mostly focus on
strategic voting over simple metric spaces as the line or the circle [42,36,4].
2 Formal Model
Metric spaces. Our model consists of a metric space (X, d), where X is a set of
elements and d : X ×X → R is a metric function. Namely, d is: (1) symmetric,
with d(x, y) = d(y, x) for every pair x, y ∈ X, (2) non-negative, with d(x, y) ≥ 0
and d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y, and (3) satisfies the triangle inequality
d(x, z) ≤ d(x, y) + d(y, z) holds for all x, y, z ∈ X.
Voters, ideal elements, and inferred weak orders. We assume n voters,
where voter i corresponds to an element vi ∈ X. We refer to vi as the ideal
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element of voter i, interpreted as her most-preferred element of the metric space.
Based on the ideal element vi, and the metric itself, we infer a ranking over the
whole metric space, where, for each two element x, y ∈ X, voter i prefers x to y
(i.e., rank x higher than y) if and only if d(vi, x) < d(vi, y). Slightly overloading
the notation, we use vi to denote both the ideal element and this inferred weak
ranking of voter i (the two cases will always be clear from the context).
Aggregation methods. An aggregation method is a functionR : Xn → X that,
given a metric space (X, d) and n ideal points V = {v1, . . . , vn} of the voters,
returns an aggregated point, denoted by R(V ), which is the winner, according
to R of the election corresponding to V over the metric space (X, d).3
Condorcet Aggregation. We adapt the Condorcet principle to our model.
Definition 1 (Condorcet winner). Let (X, d) be a metric space and consider
n voters with their ideal elements and corresponding weak rankings over X, de-
noted by V = {v1, . . . , vn}. An element x ∈ X is a Condorcet winner wrt. V if for
any other element y ∈ X, it holds that |{vi ∈ V : x i y}| > |{vi ∈ V : y i x}|.
That is, a Condorcet-winning element is such that, if chosen, then there
is no voter majority for changing it. For simplicity, we shall use the notation
V (x  y) := |{vi ∈ V : x i y}| > |{vi ∈ V : y i x}|, under which x ∈ X is
a Condorcet winner if V (x  y) > V (y  x) for every y ∈ X. An aggregation
method R is Condorcet-consistent if it elects a Condorcet winner whenever such
exists; that is, R(V ) = c where c is a Condorcet winner.4
Lp Aggregation. Besides Condorcet aggregation, we consider Lp aggregation,
a continuum of solution concepts, parameterized by a parameter 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞.
Specifically, for a given p, we look for an element which minimizes the sum of
p-factored distances to the voter ideal elements.
Definition 2. Let (X, d) be a metric space and consider n votes with their ideal
elements, denoted by V = {v1, . . . , vn}. The Lp estimator of V is defined by
Lp(V ) := argminx∈X
∑
i∈[n]
d(vi, x)
p.
Similarly, we define
L∞(V ) := argminx∈X max
i
{d(x, vi)}.
The Lp aggregation method returns this element x as the winner.
3 Indeed, due to ties, there might be co-winners. We usually do not consider these,
but assume a standard arbitrary tie-breaking mechanism.
4 Weak Condorcet winners are defined similarly, by replacing > with≥ in the definition
above. As the distinction between Strong/Weak Condorcet winners is in essence an
issue of tie breaking, we will not focus on it.
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Note that Lp(V ) is not necessarily unique, thus we treat this term as a subset
of X. (Furthermore, Lp(V ) might be empty.) To tackle the issue of uniqueness,
we sometimes consider reduced Lp aggregation: L˜p(V ) := limq→p Lq(V ), which
satisfy L˜p(V ) ⊆ Lp(V ) due to the continuity of
∑
i∈[n] d(vi, x)
p.5 These notions
would mainly be applied to resolve uniqueness issues for p = 1,∞.
Lp norm estimators have been widely studied in the statistical literature [49],
and are usually applied when estimating the parameters in linear regression
models. The choice of the parameter p in this context critically depends on the
underlying distribution, and reflects a tradeoff between the number of samples
needed (the efficiency of the estimator) and its sensitivity to departures from
normality in the residual distribution (the estimator’s robustness) [39]. To better
understand the notion of Lp estimation, observe that L1(V ) minimizes the sum of
absolute errors, L2(V ) minimizes the mean squared error, and L∞(V ) minimizes
the maximal distance from all the ideal points.6 Lp norms have been also studied
within the social choice literature (e.g., [24]). Intuitively, in the context of vote
aggregation, the choice of the parameter p reflects the relative influence of an
individual in a joint decision making. For example, applying L∞ as a voting
rule results, intuitively, with egalitarian properties in the sense that it does not
disregard outliers (in this context we mention the work of Aziz et al. [7] which use
the maximum operator to achieve this kind of egalitarianism). Further intuition
regarding the role of the parameter p in the aggregation appear in Section 4.
Axiomatic Properties. In subsequent sections we consider applications of our
general model. To better understand how different solution concepts behave in
each application, we consider several axiomatic properties.
Definition 3. An aggregation method R is majoritarian if, whenever a voter
majority select the same ideal element w, then w is selected by the aggregation
method; formally, and as there could be co-winners, R is majoritarian if |{vi ∈
V : vi = w}| ≥ |V |/2 implies that w ∈ R(V ).
Definition 4. An aggregation method R is monotone if, for each set V =
{v1, . . . , vn−1, v} of votes and for each co-winner w ∈ R(V ) it holds that w ∈
R(V ′), where V ′ = {v1, . . . , vn−1, v′} and v′ = w.
That is, majoritarity holds if the aggregated point equals the majority ideal
point, while monotonicity holds if moving an ideal point to the aggregation point
does not change the aggregation point.
Overview of the Results. Throughout, we study properties of Condorcet-
aggregation and Lp aggregation for certain applications of our general model. We
5 Note that the limit in the definition of L˜p(V ) is taken over sets, i.e., x ∈ L˜p(V ) if
there is a sequence xn → x with xn ∈ Lqn(V ) and qn → p.
6 In the statistical context there is an underlying assumption of some unknown distri-
bution; this corresponds to objective social choice, in which the goal of voting rules
is to recover some assumed ground truth [38]. Here we are interested in subjective
social choice, in which the goal of voting rules is to aggregate individual opinions of
agents [38]; thus, we do not speak of Lp estimators but of Lp aggregators.
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Table 1. Summary of our main results. Each block of rows corresponds to a dif-
ferent application, while each row corresponds to a different aggregation method. For
each application we consider existence, uniqueness, majoritarity, and the computational
complexity of each aggregation method.
Setting Aggregation Solution Unique Complexity Majoritarian Monotonicity
Plurality Condorcet Plurality no linear yes yes
Elections L˜p(V ) Plurality no linear yes yes
1D Condorcet Median for n ∈ Nodd linear yes yes
Single L˜p(V ) Median for p = 1 yes linear for p = 1, 2,∞ only for p = 1 only for p = 1
Winner Average for p = 2 efficient for p 6= 1, 2,∞
Mid-range for p =∞
Continuous Condorcet no no ? yes yes
Budgeting L˜p(V ) yes yes linear for p = 2 only for p = 1 no
efficient for p 6= 2
Social Condorcet no no ? yes yes
Welfare L˜p(V ) yes no NP-hard for p = 1,∞ only for p = 1 only for p = 1
Functions
Committee Condorcet no no ? yes yes
Elections L˜p(V ) yes for p = 1, n ∈ Nodd linear for p = 1 only for p = 1 only for p = 1
NP-hard for p =∞
Participatory Condorcet no no ? yes yes
Legislation L˜p(V ) yes no NP-hard for p = 1,∞ only for p = 1 only for p = 1
note that distance metrics may not be sufficiently expressive in general, as they
cannot express dependencies (among candidates or budget items) or semantic
relations (among sentences in a legislation). Overcoming this limitation is further
discussed in Section 9. Table 1 lists our main results.
3 Plurality Elections
We apply our model to the standard, general model of single-winner elections [5,44,18],
in which the aggregation method decides on a single winner. Specifically, we con-
sider the categorical setting, with no structure among the alternatives. Thus, in
this setting we have an underlying equidistant set of alternatives, and the task
is to aggregate voter preferences to select one of these alternatives. In a sense,
this is the simplest social choice setting which we present also as a warm-up.
Formal model. Let A be the underlying set of alternatives and notice that the
set of possible outcomes of a single-winner election over A is exactly A. Thus,
we consider the metric space (X, d) where X = A. Here we assume no structure
or dependencies between the alternatives, hence we define d to be the discrete
metric, i.e., for each x 6= y ∈ X, d(x, y) = 1, and d(x, x) = 0.
For this simple scenario, Condorcet and Lp aggregation for any 1 ≤ p 6= ∞
boils down to Plurality, while L∞(V ) equals Plurality for unanimous elections,
but otherwise selects all alternatives as co-winners.
Proposition 1. In the application to Plurality elections, Plurality is both Condorcet-
consistent and satisfies Lp(V ), for any p ≥ 1.
Proof. For each x ∈ X, let V (x) := |{vi ∈ V : vi = x}| denote the number of
votes for x among the votes V = {v1, . . . , vn}. Let z ∈ X be a Plurality winner,
i.e., every x ∈ X satisfies V (x) ≤ V (z). Then, for any x ∈ X, it follows that:
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1. V (x  z) = V (x) ≤ V (z) = V (z  x),
2.
∑
i∈[n] d(vi, x)
p = n− V (x) ≥ n− V (z) = ∑i∈[n] d(vi, z)p.
Item 1. (2.) above completes the proof for Condorcet aggregation (Lp aggre-
gation for 1 ≤ p 6=∞, resp.). For p =∞, notice that z ∈ L∞(V ) for unanimous
elections (in which all voters vote the same); however, as soon as there are at
least two different ideal points, we have maxi{d(x, vi} = 1 for every x ∈ X,
hence L∞(V ) = X, thus all alternatives tie as co-winners. uunionsq
We note that while L∞(V ) does not contain much information here, its re-
duced form L˜∞(V ) := limp→∞ Lp(V ) is restricted to the plurality elements in X.
The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1. In the application to Plurality elections, both Condorcet aggrega-
tion and Lp(V ) exist for any p ≥ 1, but are not always unique. Furthermore,
they are monotonic, majoritarian, and may be computed in linear time.
4 1-Dimensional Single-Winner Elections
Next we consider a different model of single-winner elections, corresponding to
choosing a parameter in a 1-dimensional space (say, a price for a commodity, a
tax rate) or political elections over a single political axis. We assume that some
subset X ⊆ R is given as the set of alternatives. As is the case with Plurality
elections (Section 3), the task here is to select a single alternative as a winner.
Formal model. We consider a metric space (X, d), where X ⊆ R is a set of
real numbers, and d corresponds to the absolute distance; i.e., for each x, y ∈ X,
d(x, y) = |x − y| (recall that each x ∈ X corresponds to a real number). For
the ease of notation, we shall order the ideal elements in V by their magnitude,
i.e., v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vn. We begin with a simple characterization of Condorcet
winners and Lp aggregation for p = 1, 2,∞ in this setting.
Observation 1 For the application to 1-dimensional single-winner elections,
the Condorcet aggregation and the L1 aggregation are the median of V . Fur-
thermore, if A ⊆ R is convex, then L2(V ) = 1n
∑
i vi (the average of V ), and
L∞(V ) = v1+vn2 (its mid-range).
Proof. For Condorcet aggregation, the result follows Black’s celebrated Median
Theorem [10]. The results for Lp(V ) are folklore and appear, e.g., in [39]. uunionsq
When X ⊆ R is compact, the existence of Lp aggregation for other values of
p follows since
∑
i∈[n] |vi − x|p is continuous, and thus must obtain a minimum
in A. Furthermore, if X ⊆ R is convex and 1 < p ≤ ∞, this function is strictly
convex and thus obtains a unique minima. It follows that the aggregation point
for convex domains may be efficiently computed via gradient descent methods.
If X is not convex, then an efficient algorithm can be realized by first comput-
ing Lconvp (V ), the aggregated element wrt. the convex hull conv(X) := [v1, vn].
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V =
{
0 v1, ..., vn−1
1 vn
V ′ =
{
−1 v1, ..., v(n−1)/2
1 v(n−1)/2 + 1, ..., vn
Fig. 1. The figure illustrates the influence of outliers under Lp aggregation as a function
of p. Specifically, we consider two vote distributions on X = [−1, 1], namely V , V ′ as
defined above (assume n is odd; we use n = 101). These distributions correspond to the
influence of a single voter who voted 1 wrt. consensus (in V ) and symmetric polarization
(V ′) in the rest of the votes. The blue dashed curve corresponds to Lp(V ) = 11+n1/(k−1) ,
while the red curve corresponds to Lp(V
′) =
1−( n
n+2
)1/(p−1)
1+( n
n+2
)1/(p−1) . Note that the intersection
holds in p = 2 as L2(V ) =
1
n
for both vote distributions.
The convexity of
∑
i∈[n] |vi − x|p implies that Lp(V ) is obtained in one of both
points in X closest to Lconvp (V ), i.e., either max{x ∈ X|a ≤ Lconvp (V )} or
min{x ∈ X|x ≥ Lconvp (V )}. We thus conclude the following.
Observation 2 For the application to 1-dimensional single-winner elections,
Condorcet aggregation and Lp aggregation exist wrt. any compact set of alter-
natives X ⊆ R. These aggregation rules can be efficiently computed via gradient
descent schemes. If X ⊆ R is convex then Lp(V ) is unique for every 1 < p ≤ ∞.
While the median, L1(V ), is not necessarily unique when |V | = n is even,
its reduced form, L˜1(V ) := limp→1 Lp(V ), is unique on convex domains (in a
similar manner to the case of p = ∞ presented in Section 3). L∞(V ) always
exists, however it is not always unique. To give some more intuition for the
behavior of Lp aggregation, consider the extreme cases depicted in Figure 1.
Proposition 2. For the application to 1-dimensional single-winner elections,
Condorcet aggregation and L1(V ) are majoritarian and monotonic, while Lp
aggregation for p > 1 is neither monotonic nor majoritarian.
Proof. Condorcet aggregation and L1(V ) choose the median point, hence majori-
tarity and monotonicity follow. For Lp aggregation for p > 1, the distribution V
in Figure 1 provides a counterexample to majoritarity. Monotonicity does not
hold for similar reasons. uunionsq
5 Continuous Participatory Budgeting
Here we apply our general model to a continuous model of budgeting. Several
budgeting methods exist in the literature [26,8,12], including related work on
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probabilistic social choice [13]. Here we concentrate on a model, termed con-
tinuous participatory budgeting, in which fractional funds shall be allocated to
several divisible items (in contrast to the non-divisible model of participatory
budgeting [14], in which items come with cost, and an item cannot be partially
funded): Specifically, individual financial statement items are grouped by cost
centers or departments, and there is a given, fixed budget limit. In contrast to
related models [30,22], we do not assume a fixed set of alternatives provided to
the agents to choose from. Rather, every agent may propose a set of alternatives,
(represented, e.g., by a string) and an allocation of funds between them.
Formal model. We assume that each agent i proposes a finite set of alterna-
tives Ai and a distribution of the funds between these alternatives. For normal-
ization, let the given amount be 1, and thus the distribution corresponds to a
probability vector vi ∈ R|Ai|. Let A =
⋃
iAi denote the (finite) set of alterna-
tives proposed by the agents. We shall decide how to distribute a given amount
of available funds between |A| = m alternatives. Thus, the set of possible ideal
points consists of the (m− 1)-dimensional simplex
∆m−1 := {(v1, ..., vm) ∈ Rm | vi ≥ 0 and
∑
i
vi = 1},
where each vector in ∆m−1 corresponds to a distribution of the budget among
the m alternatives. In order to define distances in this context, it is natural to
consider the metric induced by the Euclidean norm
d(x, y) = ‖x− y‖ =
(∑
i
|xi − yi|2
)1/2
.
In this setting, Condorcet winners do not always exist and the Condorcet cy-
cle usually spans over almost the entire domain (this follows from the literature
on spatial models [21]). In contrast, as f(x) =
∑
i∈[n] ‖x− vi‖p is continuous over
the compact domain ∆m−1, there always exists an element in X = (∆m−1, ‖·‖p)
that minimizes f . Furthermore, when the ideal points v1, ..., vn are not collinear
(i.e., they do not lie on the same line), f is positive and strictly convex in ∆m−1,
hence obtains a unique minimum (we refer the reader to [50] for elaborate dis-
cussion for the case of p = 1). We note that the L1-estimator in this setting is
the geometric median of v1, ..., vn (sometimes called the Fermat or the Torricelli
point), and the L2-estimator is their their center of mass, which correspond to
the average in every coordinate. Notice also that the situation here generalizes
the situation in 1-dimensional Euclidean elections described in Section 4, as a
1-simplex is a 1-dimensional Euclidean space. Thus, using gradient descent, as
described in Section 4, efficient computation for Lp aggregation follows. Majori-
tarity holds for Condorcet aggregation and only for p = 1.
Proposition 3. For the application to continuous budgeting, majoritarity holds
for L1 but not for Lp for p > 1. No p ≥ 1 satisfies monotonicity.
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Proof. For p > 1 majoritarity fails due to Proposition 2. For p = 1, majoritarity
holds as any deviation from the majority ideal point would increase the distance
from the majority voters, while, following the triangle inequality, the decrease
from other voters would not suffice to account for the increase. Monotonicity is
not satisfied even for p = 1 (e.g., a triangle). uunionsq
6 Social Welfare Functions
We consider social welfare functions, where the input for an aggregation method
is a set of n linear orders and the output of an aggregation method is another
linear order. The relevant metric space is the set of all permutations X = Sz over
a set of z underlying alternatives, equipped with the metric induced by swaps
of consecutive alternatives (other options are natural for future study).
Observation 3 In the application to social welfare functions, L1(V ) is the Ke-
meny ranking and thus is NP-hard.
Proof. Given n ordinal ballots (i.e., n linear orders) over an underlying set A
of alternatives, a Kemeny ranking is a linear order which minimizes the sum of
distances to the n linear orders, where the distance is defined via swap distance,
thus equivalent to minimizing the sum of absolute distances. uunionsq
Notice that a Kemeny ranking always exists but is not guaranteed to be
unique (e.g., whenever n = 2 with different rankings for these two voters v1, v2,
both input rankings satisfy v1, v2 ∈ L1(V ). As for L∞, it is equivalent to the NP-
hard Adjacent Element Swap Centre Permutation problem [40, Corol-
lary 1]. Thus Lp is NP-hard here. We believe that Lp aggregation for other values
of p, as well as Condorcet aggregation, are also computationally hard.
Conjecture 1. Lp aggregation for 1 < k <∞ and Condorcet aggregation for the
application to social welfare functions are all NP-hard.
As for existence and uniqueness, we observe the following. (Indeed, even for
p = 1 and odd number of voters, uniqueness is not guaranteed; e.g., consider
votes v1 : a  b  c, v2 : b  c  a, and v3 : c  a  b.)
Corollary 2. For the application to social welfare functions Lp aggregation for
any p > 1 always exists but not are not always unique. Condorcet aggregation
does not always exist.
Proof. For Condorcet, consider A = {a, b, c} and V = {v1, v2, v3} with v1 = a 
b  c, v2 = b  c  a, and v3 = c  a  b. Then, e.g., a  b  c→ a  c  b→
b  c  a→ b  a  c→ c  a  b→ c  b  a→ a  b  c is a cycle.
Lp aggregation is not monotone for any p ≥ 1.
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Example 1. Consider two ideal points, v1 = a  b  c  d  e and v2 =
e  a  b  c  d. Then, the ranking w = a  b  e  c  d satisfies
w ∈ L1(V ), L∞(V ). Changing v2 to vote as w, however, would result in a new
aggregation point a  b  c  e  d, thus monotonicity does not hold. Similar
examples exist for other 1 < k 6=∞.
Proposition 4. Condorcet and L1 aggregation are majoritarian for the appli-
cation to social welfare functions, while Lp aggregation for p > 1 are not.
Proof (sketch). For Condorcet and L1 aggregation, observe that selecting the
linear order corresponding to the voter majority’s choice would be preferred by
the voter majority to any other linear order; somehow similarly, deviating from
this linear order would increase the sum of absolute errors. For Lp aggregation
for p > 1, consider the set {a, b, c} of underlying alternatives and three voters
with linear orders a  b  c, a  b  c, and c  a  b. Then, we have that the
Lp aggregation of a  b  c (which is the majority choice) is 2p, which is at least
4 for p ≥ 2, but the Lp aggregation of a  c  b is 1p + 1p + 1p = 3, which is
smaller. A similar, albeit larger counterexample can be built for 1 < p 6=∞. uunionsq
7 Committee Elections
Here we consider selecting a committee from a given set of candidates.
Formal model. Let A be the underlying set of alternatives and notice that the
set of possible committees is 2A (that is, the set of all possible subsets ofA). Thus,
we consider the metric space (X, d) where X ⊆ 2A; specifically, each x ∈ X is a
subset of A, x ⊆ A. As two specific cases, note that X = 2A corresponds to the
setting where the size of the committee is not given a priori but is decided by the
aggregation method itself. This scenario was considered by Kilgour [33], Duddy
et al. [17], and Faliszewski et al. [27]. However, denoting by 2Ak the set of all k-
size subsets over A, note that X = 2Ak corresponds to the setting of k-committee
selection, in which k committee members shall be elected. This setting is studied
quite extensively [25]. As we assume no structure or dependencies between the
alternatives, we do not impose any particular structure on X and define d to be
the symmetric distance, i.e., for each x, y ∈ X, d(x, y) = |x4y| (indeed, d(x, y)
is the hamming distance between the corresponding binary vectors of x and y).
First, recall the definition of the median element [35]: Consider an election E
based on n ideal elements V = {v1, . . . , vn}, vi ∈ X. Then, the median element
is the element x ∈ X which contains exactly those alternatives a ∈ A for which
|{v ∈ V : a ∈ v}| ≥ n/2. That is, the median element is the unique element
containing exactly those alternatives with weak voter majority support.
Proposition 5. For the application to committee elections, if X = 2A then
L1(V ) chooses the median element, while if X = 2
A
k , then L1 aggregation is
approval voting.
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Proof. For X = 2A, for a set of voters V , the aggregated point x = L1(V )
minimizes the expression
∑
vi∈V |x4vi|, which equals to
∑
vi∈V
∑
a∈A 1a∈x4vi ,
which equals to
∑
a∈A
∑
vi∈V 1a∈x4vi . Thus, any element y different from the
median element x would give a higher sum, as for each a ∈ x4y,∑vi∈V 1a∈y4vi ≥∑
vi∈V 1a∈x4vi holds. The case where X = 2
A
k follows similarly. uunionsq
Remark 1. The MW rule, described recently by Faliszewski et al. [27], which
elects a committee containing all candidates with strong majority approval, is
the L1 aggregation where X = 2
A. Notice that L1(V ) is not unique for even
number of voters (e.g., consider V = {v1, v2} with v1 : {a} and v2 = {b}; then,
both {a} and {b} are winners). For odd number of voters L1(V ) is unique.
For X = 2A, Finding L∞(V ) is equivalent to the NP-hard Closest String
problem [29]. We also mention that it is equivalent to the variable number of
winners counterpart of minimax approval voting [11].
Corollary 3. For the application to committee elections with variable number
of winners, computing L∞(V ) is NP-hard.
We believe that for all values of p > 1, Lp aggregation is NP-hard. Our
belief comes from the observation that, similarly to L∞, there are dependencies
between the underlying alternatives, as, for p > 1, we wish to be, in a sense, not
too far from the ideal point of any voter.
Conjecture 2. For the application to committee elections with variable number
of winners, Lp aggregation is NP-hard for any p > 1.
Condorcet winners do not always exist for this application.
Example 2. Consider alternatives A = {a, b, c} and voters V = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5
where v1 = v2 = ∅, v3 = {a, b}, v4 = {a, c}, and v5 = {b, c}. Then, ∅ beats all
other points in the metric space, except {a, b, c}, but {a, b, c} is beaten by any
of {a}, {b}, and {c}; thus, no Condorcet winner exists here.
Condorcet aggregation for this application can be phrased also as a Condorcet-
consistent aggregation method for a binary combinatorial domain with top-based
input, where the completion principle is based on the Hamming distance (see,
e.g., [15]). Condorcet aggregation was studied by Darmann [16] which demon-
strated the computational intractability of a related problem [16, Theorem 3.7];
we believe that the proof there translates to our setting.
Conjecture 3. For the application to committee elections with variable number
of winners, Condorcet aggregation is NP-hard.
Observation 4 For the application to committee elections with variable num-
ber of winners, Condorcet and L1 aggregation are both majoritarian, while Lp
aggregation for p > 1 are not majoritarian.
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Proof. For Condorcet aggregation majoritary always holds. For L1 aggregation,
the claim follows as the median element would be the choice of the voter majority.
For Lp aggregation for p > 1, consider the set A = {a1, a2} of underlying
alternatives and the set of voters {{a}, {a}, {b}}. Then, even though the majority
choice is {a}, the Lp aggregation of {a} is 2p, which is at least 4 where p ≥ 2,
but the Lp aggregation of {a, b} is 1p + 1p + 1p = 3. Similar counterexample for
1 < k < 2 can be described, albeit with more voters. uunionsq
The following example shows that monotonicity is not satisfied for p > 1.
Example 3. Consider an underlying set A = {a, b, c, d} of alternatives and ideal
points V = {v1, v2} with v1 = ∅ and v2 = A = {a, b, c, d}. Then, the point {a, b}
is an aggregation point for Lp aggregation, for p > 1, however if v2 moves to
{a, b} then the new aggregation point would be {a}.
Condorcet aggregation does satisfy monotonicity, as it does for all applica-
tions we consider in this paper. L1 aggregation is monotone here as the median
element would stay when moving a voter ideal point to it.
8 Participatory Legislation
We consider participatory legislation (see, e.g., [2]). Clearly, plurality elections
can be applied to approve a proposed legislation, or to choose among a given
set of proposed legislation. Even if such a proposal is made by an elected legis-
lation committee, such a process falls short of the egalitarian vision of the 1789
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen [6], which states that all citizens
have the right of contributing to the formation of the law personally, not only
via their representatives (Article VI). Hence, we focus here on aggregating text
drafts, e.g., to jointly write a constitution. In fact, our main motivation for this
work comes from the apparent lack of literature on a participatory approach to
this key social choice setting in the computational social choice community.
Formal model. Here we have a certain alphabet Σ. The possible outcomes, as
well as the possible votes, are all strings over Σ; thus, we consider a metric space
(X, d) where X = Σ∗, such that each x ∈ X is a string over the alphabet Σ.
Various possibilities exist for defining the metric d. The first thing that comes
to mind is to consider the Levenstein edit distance: For two ideal element x, y ∈
X, the Levenstein distance d(x, y) is the minimum number of edit operations
of the form insert (which adds a character at a certain position), delete (which
deletes a character at a certain position), and swap (which swaps two consecutive
characters) that shall be performed to convert x into y. Assume that strings
are documents consisting of a sequences of sentences, namely that characters
are sentences. We feel that in this setting, this metric is not appropriate as it
gives the same importance to the identity of the sentences as to their order.
However, when writing, e.g., a constitution, the contents of the sentences in
it are more important than their order. For this reason, we consider a different
distance metric, namely a weighted-Levenstein distance d(x, y), which equals the
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minimum weight of operations that transform x to y, with the following weighted
operations: an insert operation costs 1, a delete operation costs 1, and a swap
operation costs 1/`2, where ` is the length of the longest ideal point proposed by
any voter. The situation now boils down to a two-phase election: First, one shall
find the set of sentences to be included in the constitution; second, one shall find
the best ordering of these sentences. We consider these two phases in turn.
Phase 1: Selecting the set of sentences. Here, only considering the set of
sentences in each ideal point, the task is to aggregate those n sets of sentences
into one set of sentences. We assume that the resulting aggregated has at most
one copy of each sentence. Thus, this setting is formally equivalent to multiwinner
elections with variable number of winners, studied in Section 7.
Phase 2: Selecting the order of the selected sentences. Following phase
1, we shall order the elected sentences. This setting is formally equivalent to
social welfare functions, studied in Section 6.
Combining the two phases. Naturally, we get the combined hardness of the
two phases: Existence is guaranteed only for Lp aggregation; uniqueness is not
guaranteed for any aggregation method; Condorcet and L1 aggregation are ma-
joritarian, while Lp aggregation for p > 1 are not majoritarian; and computa-
tional hardness follows.
Remark 2. For L1 aggregation, one can heuristicly solve Phase 1 (e.g., using one
of the methods for Kemeny ranking studied by Ali and Meila˘ [1]), followed by
the polynomial time algorithm for L1 aggregation for multiwinner elections with
variable number of winners discussed in Section 7.
9 Outlook
We proposed a general metric-based model and applied it to a broad range of
social choice settings. Some general directions for future research include: con-
sidering further distances, such as those described by Schiavinotoo [43]; study-
ing further aggregation methods for participatory legislation, including NLP-
based methods which take into account the semantics of the aggregated text
drafts; developing the general model to incorporate proxy voting [37] and sybil
resilience [45]; and, for Lp aggregation, studying further axiomatic properties
that would allow a principled way of choosing the value of p. Below we discuss
in more detail one such avenue which we believe is of top importance.
Voting and deliberation. As our model infer voter preferences over the metric
elements based only on their ideal points, it might produce inferior aggregated
points. This is especially problematic where synergies exist between committee
members in multiwinner elections; where interdependent items are to be funded
in participatory budgeting; or where different sentence ordering alter the mean-
ing of the resulting text. One remedy for this might be to incorporate Reality (the
status quo) in a process that interleaves voting with deliberation; for instance,
similarly in spirit to Reality-aware action plans [46] and to other works [48], we
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envision an iterative process where the deliberation phase of each iteration is
based on the aggregated point identifying based on the voting phase of the last
iteration, following which participants may change their votes; the result of such
an iterative process could be an aggregated point that has majority support over
the status quo, or else a recognition that the status quo is presently preferred
over any aggregated alternative.
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